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It is well established that a small group—which is committed to interacting in the future—
can overcome its members’ incentives to act sel…shly and cooperate. However, situations
with this type of commitment are rare in economics. For example, consumers usually
choose a supplier each time they buy a good. Can the consumers’ and suppliers’ short
term incentives to not pay their bills and provide low quality be overcome? This paper
shows they can be if people know each other’s reputation.
The model used in this analysis is a repeated matching game. This paper is the …rst
to extensively compare this game with the more familiar standard repeated game. After
developing the equilibrium condition, two key di¤erences between the set of equilibria in
standard repeated games and repeated matching games are illustrated. In this model
simple optimal penal codes (Abreu [1]) and trigger strategies are not equilibria.
This research builds on the work of Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite [[18] OFP hereafter]
and Kandori [15] in repeated matching games. OFP formalized the strategies used in this
l i t e r a t u r ea n ds h o w e dt h a tc o o p e r a t i o nc o u l db ea c h i e v e dw i t hac o n t i n u u mo fb u y e r sa n d
sellers. Kandori extended these results to …nite populations matched randomly. Here I
generalize Kandori [15] to games where players choose whom to be matched with and to
interactions with more than two participants.
As an example of the general model consider a day labor market. Every morning
employers show up, and select several people from the laborers present to work for the day.
The results here allow the employers to choose who they want to work for them—as long
as they choose fewer than some upper bound. Two restrictions are that there is no excess
supply of jobs or workers and all employers and employees are nearly the same.
In Kandori [15] random matching was required but it is hard to imagine a realistic
example of either market where all matching is random. As will be shown if even one
player can choose who to interact with then the strategies used in Kandori [15] fail. This
might seem odd since players are basically the same, but after people deviate players are
di¤erent. Someone who just cheated will have to be punished and employers may prefer
to hire someone else.
The equilibria will be social norms (OFP [18]). These strategies are based on players’
social status (or reputation). Given the social status of the people interacting a social
standard of behavior tells them what action to take today, and then the transition rule
updates the social status of players depending on what she and the people she is interacting
with have done in the past. These strategies will have to be sequential equilibria, and they
also satisfy several other restrictions.
These further restrictions are motivated by the fact that the equilibria only use local
1information processing (OFP [18]). A strategy uses local information processing if it only
uses information that the players involved in an interaction should know. Social norms only
use what a player and the people she interacts with have done in the past, and thus satisfy
this restriction. Without this restriction a strategy might require a great deal of knowledge
on the part of players, an amount that would easily be untenable in a large society. Due
to this restriction Hasker [14] shows that cooperation can be sustained by players sending
messages back and forth, without any other source of information.
Given this restriction, should something be considered an equilibrium if too much infor-
mation causes it to break down? If information sources such as newspapers have to be ruled
out to make a strategy an equilibrium the equilibrium is not interesting. Local information
processing was required to be certain the strategy didn’t require too much information,
straightforward (Kandori [15]) is required to make certain that the strategy doesn’t require
that players have too little information. It makes certain that there is no value to this
extra information by requiring that players would do the same thing even if they had full
information.
The motivation for the …nal restriction on the set of equilibria is based on the same
principal. Surely we don’t want to require our players to know the way everyone decides who
to interact with? And what is the di¤erence between requiring them to interact with one
group of people forever and always using a certain matching rule? Clearly the di¤erence is
philosophical, in both cases an untenable amount of commitment is required. Thus it seems
an equilibrium of a repeated matching game should not depend on a particular matching
rule, and universal equilibria satisfy this restriction (Kandori [15], with new terminology.)
This requirement also includes that the strategy must work for all population sizes, obviously
desirable and relatively trivial if the strategy workds for all matching rules.
The e¤ect of these re…nements is to make social norms extremely simple strategies to
follow. Given these restrictions a player can have any beliefs and know that the best thing
for them to do is just follow the social standard of behavior. As long as all players act in
their best interests, a given player does not need to know anything but the social status of
the people she is interacting with today. All the rest will take care of itself.
The end result is a folk theorem that holds in any stage game that is not one of pure
cooperation—the most general su¢cient condition for folk theorems in the standard re-
peated game (Abreu, Dutta and Smith [2]). The results in Abreu et al. are more general
because the minmax can be in mixed strategies, but this is not a great weakness in matching
games where the option of not interacting is both in pure strategies and the minmax. It is
also shown here that the folk theorem holds without correlated actions, and holds if payo¤s
are slightly heterogenous.
2The literature on repeated matching games was started by Rosenthal [20] and Rosenthal
and Landau [21]. OFP [18] de…ne local information processing and show that with a
continuum of players a trigger strategy can establish a folk theorem. Kandori [15] presents
a folk theorem for many two player random matching games; de…nes the straightforward
re…nement, and is the …rst to require universality.
Kandori [[15] Sect. 4] and Ellison [7] analyze what can be done with less information. In
games with a dominant strategy and uniform matching these papers …nd that a “contagion”
strategy sometimes works. The initial defection leads other players to defect, until everyone
is playing the dominant strategy all of the time. This strategy works only if the population
is small relative to players patience and requires that players have “too little” information.
Ahn and Suominen [3] and Hasker [14] have considered what happens if all information
is generated through communication. Ahn and Suominen assume players talk to their
neighbors (word of mouth). Those results are similar to Kandori [[15] Sect. 4] with all of
the same restrictions. Hasker uses a stronger type of communication, and comes up with
a more optimistic answer. In that paper if players can send costly messages (letters) to
all other players then the folk theorem can be proven. The analysis is only for two player
games, and the stage game must be neither one of pure con‡ict or pure cooperation, but
otherwise the results are the same as here.
Another related line of research is the limited information folk theorems. The classic
problem in this literature is the imperfect private information problem. Kandori and
Matsushima [16] prove a folk theorem in this setting using communication. They use
noiseless communication to overcome the noisiness of the original observation. Ben-Porath
and Kahneman [4] analyzes a situation where only some players observe what each player
does. The motivating example is a large corporation where people only see others in their
department. However, that result relies on public declarations and thus would not work in
extremely large corporations. This paper shows that if players’ payo¤s do not depend on
people outside their division then there is a folk theorem appropriate for these corporations.
The next section of the paper presents the model. Following this the equilibrium
condition is established. Next we illustrate the cost of local information processing by
showing that trigger strategies and simple optimal penal codes are not equilibria in the
repeated matching game. In this section a simple concrete random matching game is
described—the Looped Townsend Turnpike. In section 5 the main theorem is presented.
The theorem is also extended to the case where there is some heterogeneity between players,
and the problems with mixed strategy equilibria are discussed.
32 A Description of the Model
In a matching game there are I populations each with the same number of members, which
are at most countable. Call these populations Pi i 2f 1;2;3;:::Ig, then a matching rule
¹ is a distribution over deterministic matching rules. A deterministic matching rule is a
function Ã : P1 !£ I
k=2Pk whose projection onto Pk is one to one for all k 6=1 .T h ep l a y e r s
m a t c h e dw i t hp l a y e rj are denoted ¹(j), and when the group is matched they play a stage
game.1
Until subsection 4.3 in the stage game all that matters is a player’s population, it does
not matter which player is involved. This is also true about the strategy and many other
times during our analysis. When this is true I will describe a player as i and it should
be understood that I am speaking of an arbitrary member of population Pi. When I need
t os p e a ko fa ni n d i v i d u a lIw i l lr e f e rt oh e ra sj. Thus in the stage game player i has a
…nite action set, Ai, and payo¤ function, ¼i : £I
k=1Ak ! R. A player’s own action will be
written …rst in her payo¤ function, and the vector of actions taken by the other people in
her group will be written as a¹(i) 2£ k6=iAk. Without loss of generality (see corollary 2)
players use correlated actions from the set A =¢( £Ai). I nt h i sp a p e rt h em i n m a xi si n




=0 . Note that since we are discussing matching games players should have the
option of not interacting, and thus the mixed strategy minmax is in pure strategies.
In a repeated matching game the interaction above will happen ad in…nitum, with players
discounting their payo¤s between periods by ± 2 (0;1).D e … n e Ht as the history of the
entire game up to period t. This includes the actions of all players (and who they interacted
with) in period 0 to t¡1. Then the matching rule in each period is determined by a matching
regime ¹r,t h u si ft h es e to fm a t c h i n gr u l e si sM, ¹r : £1
t=1Ht ! M.Apath is a sequence
of action pro…les w =
©
atª1
t=1 at 2 A. Her payo¤ from such a path is her discounted value,
vi : A1 ! R.
The equilibria will be social norms fZ;¾;¿g. The social status of a player of population
i in period t is denoted zt
i 2 Zi:Z= £I
i=1Zi is the set of social statuses, and it will be
…nite. The social standard of behavior is a function from social status to action today, and
is denoted ¾ : £iZi ! A.T h e transition rule is ¿ = f¿ig
I
i=1. It takes a player’s social
1An example of an interesting matching rule is to choose one population i 2f 1;2;3;:::Ig.T h e n c h o o s e
players one at a time from this population and ask them to select one person from each of the other
populations who is not already chosen. This matching rule is a model of employers hiring employees.
The inverse of this matching rule is also of interest. Select a player from all of the populations except 1
one at a time, and ask her which of the P1 she wants to be matched with among the j 2 P1 that are not
already matched with someone of her population. This matching rule is a model of customers choosing a
store to buy from.
4status—zt¡1
i , what action she took last period—at¡1
i , and what action she was supposed
to take—¾t¡1
i ; adds in the same information for her opponents this period and assigns the
player a new social status. For simplicity ¿ will be restricted so that it is not directly a
function of at¡1
i and ¾t¡1
i , instead it is only a function of whether at¡1
i = ¾t¡1
i , where it’s
understood that if ¾t¡1
i is a correlated action at¡1
i = ¾t¡1
i implies that at¡1
i is the correct
action given the outcome of the public randomization device. Note that these social norms








.W h e n
players use a social norm they are told zt
¹(i) a f t e rt h e ya r em a t c h e di np e r i o dt.
Social norms will have to be sequential equilibria and satisfy two other re…nements.
De…ne FIt(X) as the state where the players in X know Ht,a n dl e tXjy be the variable
X given that y occurred.
De…nition 1 An equilibrium is straightforward if given a matching regime, for all i and






Notice that a sequential equilibrium must be a subgame perfect equilibrium if it is
straightforward.
De…nition 2 An equilibrium is universal if it is an equilibrium for all matching regimes
and population sizes.
To clarify some conventions and terminology, in this paper a standard repeated game
means a repeated matching game where the same players are always matched together. In
an abuse of terminology a random matching game is a repeated matching game where the
matching regime is independent of the history of the game, and a repeated matching game
is one where the matching regime can depend on history. When we refer to an equilibrium
we mean a sequential equilibrium that satis…es straightforwardness and universality. A
static Nash equilibrium is an equilibrium of the repeated matching game when the discount
factor is zero. A strict path equilibrium is one where along all paths that can be reached
after some Ht the incentive to take the equilibrium action is met with a strict inequality.
2.1 Equilibrium Condition
In this section the most important re…nement is universality. The only e¤ect in this section
of straightforward is that we don’t need to worry about players’ information sets or beliefs.
Local information processing merely limits the type of social norms we must consider.
However, universality means that a “game” in this paper is equivalent to a large class of
games in a standard analysis. In a standard analysis the matching regime and population
size are part of the de…nition of the game. This means that usually the future is a unique
5path—at worst it has a unique expectation. Here there is no unique future, even in
expectation.
One reason universality is required is because an analyst must frequently admit to
uncertainty about the matching regime in a large repeated matching game. If he or she
faces this uncertainty she will have to do analysis similar to that done here. Given that she
must embark on this type of analysis, universality actually makes it as simple as possible.
Otherwise he or she must worry about the population size and guess at the speci…c matching
regimes she thinks possible. Under universality none of this matters. All that matters are
the payo¤s of the stage game and the strategy—or the analysis is no more complex than
the strategy.
To clarify exposition we will identify a player by her social status, or zt
i 2 Zi for i 2
















1. ht;s be a continuation history for player zt





µ£ Zl l 2f 1;2;3;:::Igni b et h ep o s s i b l es e to fs t a t u s e si np e r i o dt+s given
ht;s
Then let h® =l i m s!1 ht;s





























= [®h® for all such ®. It is de…ned
given ¾t
i—the pure action zt
i should take today, and at
i 2 Ai—the action she actually takes.
Notice that this is independent of any given population. In essence since the population
can be countable we can construct a large enough population that we can achieve this
independence, as the following lemma proves.
Lemma 1 Assume fZ;¿;¾g is an equilibrium social norm, then the set of potential con-

















can be reached by some sequence of play, thus every element can be achieved after a …nite




µ£ l6=iZl it is …nite,





statuses of some I ¡ 1 players.
Second, the set of ht;s is …nite for every s.S i n c e ht;1 is unique, and ht;s = ht;s¡1 [ z¡i,











6Now since for each s it only requires a …nite population then for all s it only requires a
countable population to make every continuation history ht;s is possible. Universal requires
that the strategy is an equilibrium with a countable population. Universal also requires that





























Remark 1 If we let the social status be a function of ¾t
i instead of only if at
i = ¾t
i then the
above construction would depend on the population because ¾ would generate a distribution













may seem complex, except for very odd strategies this set will be
…nite and analytically simple. Furthermore, the analyst only cares about one of the limiting


























































































i’s status in period t+s given the history ht;s.N o w
































is …nite, it is compact and ¼i is continuous on it, thus vi is
continuous ­ and by Tychono¤’s theorem, ­ is compact. Thus w.l.o.g. assume fw°g
1
°=1








































































With these lemmas completed the equilibrium condition is immediate.












































































. It is necessary








In words this states a strategy is an equilibrium if and only if it is when cooperation
leads to the worst possible payo¤ and deviating is rewarded as much as possible. A reader
may think that the condition is excessively restrictive. However, in the folk theorem section
we will show a endogenous matching regime that actually achieves this, (subsection 4.1).
Thus it is possible to give examples where this condition is binding. In fact, this example
was developed after the equilibrium condition was established. It was easy to see that it
failed the above condition, …nding a matching regime that generated these payo¤s required
more thought.
Note that ¾t
i is compared with Ain¾t
i but not with itself. Upon inspection of the
equilibrium condition the reason is transparent. In order for the inequality to be true
when comparing ¾t
i with ¾t














: With such a








vi (w)=vi (w0). Regardless of who she meets, a player’s payo¤ is always the same. Of
course if ¾t
i is a mixed strategy this condition must be satis…ed, which is why we do not
consider such strategies.
3 The Cost of Local Information Processing.
In this section I will illustrate what assuming local information processing has cost the
analysis. This cost will be illustrated with two negative results. First it will be proven
that there are no trigger strategies which are equilibria. Second it will be shown that there
is not always a simple optimal penal code. Thus the simplest equilibria and the analytically
most important equilibria in a standard repeated game are lost.
The primary e¤ect of local information processing is that multiple deviations must now
be considered. By local information processing a player’s status can only be a¤ected by
players she has interacted with in the past. This means that multiple people can deviate and
all of them must be handled simultaneously. For trigger strategies this means players can
have to punish forever independent of whether they cooperate today or not—thus they will
defect. For simple optimal penal codes since each player already gets the worst equilibrium
payo¤ after a deviation simultaneous deviations can give them a lower payo¤, and they will
deviate again.
Of course both of these strategies would be equilibria if it was not for straightforwardness
and universality. However as will be shown only weak versions of both of these re…nements
8are needed. It is the primary assumption that causes the failure.
3.1 The Failure of Trigger Strategies in Repeated Matching Games.
The trigger strategy is a classic strategy commonly used to prove folk theorems. In Okuno-
Fujiwara and Postlewaite [18] it is used to prove the …rst folk theorem for random match-
ing games. In that paper local information processing is assumed but equilibria are not
straightforward or universal. In standard repeated games Friedman [9] proved the …rst folk
theorem using trigger strategies. Later papers have used other strategies only to generalize
his results. In contrast trigger strategies are not equilibria in repeated matching games.
The easiest way to understand this is to consider a concrete matching game, the Looped
Townsend Turnpike—a modi…ed Townsend Turnpike (Townsend [22]). Imagine there is a
circular road, along this turnpike there are n restaurants at n di¤erent locations. There
are n truckers that go around this turnpike, each going one restaurant forward each period
and eating at each restaurant. Label the truckers c 2f 1;2;3;:::;ng and the restaurateurs
r 2f 1;2;3;:::ng; then in period t the restaurateurs’ matching regime is ¹t
r =( t + r)mod n
2.
The restaurateur can either produce high quality (H) or low quality (L) food, and the




trucker P 2;1 ¡2;2
N 4;¡1 0;0
(2)
This is a prisoners dilemma where fP;Hg is the socially desirable outcome.3 For a
trigger strategy in this game let the set of social statuses be Zr = Zt = f0;1g and everyone’s































2where (t + r)mod n is the remainder of
t+r
n times n.
3Note that cooperation due to the threat of personal enforcement will not work in large populations.
Personal enforcement requires ±
n ¸
1




9In this strategy a player is “good” if her status is zero. As long as her status is good
she cooperates (sells high quality food or pays) with all good players she meets, otherwise
she trusts no one (L or N).
Now in order to see why this is not an equilibrium, given ± choose k such that




This k is su¢cient so that if a trucker has to cooperate today and punish someone (play
fN;Lg) for the next k periods she will cheat and play N today. In this matching game
this means the next k restaurateurs have the bad status (zt
r =1 ).
By universal, the strategy must be an equilibrium if the restaurateurs population is larger
than k. For simplicity assume the next k restaurateurs deviate at once. By straightforward
the critical trucker can know of these deviations and will defect—thus this strategy is not
an equilibrium.
We could overcome this problem if we modi…ed trigger strategies so they were not
absorbing state social norms.
De…nition 4 In an absorbing state social norm there is a social status z¤
i i = f1;2;3;:::Ig
after which a player who has status z¤
i will never have her status changed in any future.
In fact no absorbing state social norms that satisfy two reasonable criteria are equilibria.
De…nition 5 As o c i a ln o r mi sminimal if there is a …nite sequence of play such that every
zi 2 Zi is the status of some player from population i at the end of this sequence of play.
De…nition 6 As o c i a ln o r mi stime independent if Z is minimal and at any period t there
is a …nite continuation sequence of play such that zi 2 Zi is the status of some player from
population i at the end of this sequence of play.
Thus social norms that violate one of these criteria either have “wasted” social statuses
‡oating around, or have a …nite initial period in which the strategy is not an absorbing state
social norm. Without loss of generality, assume that ¾ (z¤) is a static Nash equilibrium each
period.4
Lemma 3 Assume fZ;¿;¾g is an equilibrium absorbing state social norm which is time










is a static Nash equilibrium.
4Clearly a player with status z
¤
i must play a best response each period, and if there is such a status for
every role then ¾(z
¤) must be a nash equilibrium.
10Proof. Assume ¾(z0) is not a static Nash equilibrium, and ¾1 (z0) is not a best re-
sponse. Then since the player of population 1 c a nb em a t c h e dw i t hap l a y e rw i t hs t a t u s
z¤























since if a player deviates today they can also be matched with the person
with status z¤
2. Thus the strategy is not an equilibrium.
Notice that while it might be very complicated to get the status pro…les z0 and z¤
2 the
matching regime given these statuses is very simple. If z0 is the initial status pro…le, all
the matching regime has to be is “i went travelling for a while, and now she’s coming back
home.” Furthermore, notice that she might be traveling for a very long time and if at any
time she gets some news from home she will deviate before she returns. She only needs
one piece of information, is it tenable to assume that she will never get it?
O n ep o s s i b l er e s p o n s et ot h i sr e s u l ti st op o i n tt h e… n g e ra tuniversality. Certainly—one
would argue—trigger strategies would work if the matching regime was “suitably di¤use.”
This is precisely the case that Kandori [[15] Sect. 4] and Ellison [7] analyze. OFP [18]
actually assume a continuum of players, and then extend their argument to games with a
large …nite population and a di¤use matching regime. Combined with this would have to
be an argument that straightforward is too strong. Perhaps the weakest possible version
would be that players only learn the social status of one player with probability " each
period. But with an absorbing state social norm the information that someone has status
z¤
2 is permanent, and this small " probability would build up enough information in …nite
time.
Another weakening of straightforward brings out a di¤erent di¢culty with equilibria
that violate this criteria. Assume that players only know the status of k other players—
t h e i r“ n e i g h b o r s . ” I nt h i sc a s eas t r a t e g yw o u l dh a v et ob ea ne q u i l i b r i u mw h e nap l a y e r
knows that all k have defected, and thus their patience must be higher than in the standard
repeated game. When straightforward is weakened we have to have players patient enough
that their information doesn’t matter, or they are more patient than informed.
A …nal response is that we aren’t really interested in sequential equilibria, for large
societies only equilibria where a small fraction of the population deviates should be of
interest. The problem with this is that the matching regime must be di¤use. If there
is a small group that matches primarily among themselves then the deviations in this
neighborhood could spread. While a di¤use matching regime is a reasonable assumption
if violations don’t matter much, with strategies as susceptible to unraveling as absorbing
state social norms the assumption is strong.
In Kandori [15] a re…nement not used here was required. This re…nement was global
stability—given everyone follows the equilibrium strategy from any period on eventually
11the payo¤ will return to the initial path’s payo¤. This restriction was intended to rule out
“contagion” strategies—a type of absorbing state social norm. However these strategies are
not equilibria because of local information processing and straightforwardness. Perhaps no
assumptions make an absorbing state social norm a “reasonable” equilibrium of a repeated
matching game.
3.2 A random matching game without a simple optimal penal code.
The simple optimal penal code (Abreu [1]) is one of the seminal results in the literature of
standard repeated games. The simple optimal penal code is de…ned by …nding the worst
equilibrium path for each player. The set of these paths is the simple optimal penal code,
and this code makes it easy to …nd all of the equilibria of the standard repeated game. If
a path is an equilibrium, it is an equilibrium when after any deviation the continuation
path is the worst equilibrium path for that player. Thus instead of …nding a potentially
countable set of equilibria with one equilibrium you can …nd all of the others.
That this construction does not generalize to repeated matching games is not surprising.
The result depends on the fact that in any history of the game there can be no more than one
deviator that must be punished—simultaneous deviations are ignored. Local information
processing makes this impossible in repeated matching games, and thus the result should
not generalize. The simplicity of this intuition is best appreciated by analyzing an example.
Consider the stage game:
column
Hr Hc Mr Mc
Hr 4;2 3;3 0;¡2 1;0
row Hc 0;0 2;4 0;¡1 0;0
Mr 0;0 0;1 ¡4;¡1 0;0
Mc ¡1;0 ¡2;0 ¡5;¡5 ¡1;¡4
(6)
and let ± = 1
2. This game has a unique worst equilibrium path for each player, which
is (for i 2f r;cg)
w(i)=
(
fMi;M igifi deviated last period
fHi;H ig else
(7)
It can be easily veri…ed that if w(i) is both the initial path and the path after any deviation
by either player then this is an equilibrium. It must be the worst since it’s payo¤ is zero.
The proof of uniqueness can be requested from the author.
To construct a social norm that uses the simple optimal penal code in this game, let the
set of social statuses be Zr = Zc = f0;1;2g, write the transition rule as a two step function
12¿ = f¿n;¿xg (for i 2f r;cg)




























0 if e zi · e z¹(i)
e zt
i else



























since zero is the individually rational payo¤ the discounted payo¤ for player i can not
decrease. Since ¼i (Hi;H i) is the highest possible payo¤ in the stage game, if player i
receives ¼i (Mi;M i) today then she must receive ¼i (Hi;H i) forever in the future or she will
deviate. Now assume that two random players r1 and c1 both deviated yesterday and will
interact tomorrow. Since r1 and c1 will meet tomorrow it is impossible for both of them to
expect to play fHi;H ig tomorrow, and the simple optimal penal code is not an equilibrium.







Note how weak straightforward can be for this result to hold. If each player has an
">0 chance of learning the social status of a random player the strategy will not be an
equilibrium. Universal was hardly used at all, the matching regime only has to allow
players who last period be matched next period.
4T h e F o l k T h e o r e m
The folk theorem is fairly immediate given the equilibrium condition, the only remaining
step is to describe the strategy. Before taking this step I will …rst show the e¤ect of
endogenous matching regimes by example. This will be done by showing why the strategies
used to prove the folk theorem in Kandori [15] are not equilibria with endogenous matching.
This should explain to the reader two important facts. First why endogenous matching
regimes matter. Second, why the equilibrium condition is binding. One might think that
the matching regimes needed to achieve this must be extremely counter-intuitive, but in
the following example the matching regime is based on a preference to reward people who
13haven’t deviated. The only argument could be with the tie-breaking rule, which will be
discussed.
4.1 The E¤ect of Choice Driven Matching.
Consider the following prisoner’s dilemma:
column
Cc Dc
row Cr 1;2 4;¡1
Dr ¡2;2 0;0
(11)


































> > > <
> > > :
fCr;C cg if zt
r =0 ;zt
c =0
fCr;D cg if zt
r > 0;zt
c =0







where r is a representative row player and c is a representative column player.
Consider a matching game where there are two column players fc1;c 2g and two row
players fr1;r 2g. The …rst priority of the matching rule will be to maximize the payo¤
of the column player with lowest status, and c1 if zt
c1 = zt
c2. When the column player is
indi¤erent the tie breaking rule will be to interact with the row player who has deviated
l e s s ,a n di ft h i sf a i l st h e nr1.
Now consider a subgame where fc2;r 1;r 2g all deviated yesterday for the …rst time. If
r1 cooperates today then her payo¤ will be:
¼c (C;D)+±¼c (C;D)+±2¼c (C;C)+
±3
1 ¡ ±












And she will deviate for all ±<1. This counter example depends on the tie breaking rule,
but is it unreasonable a priori? Unless one can reject the tie breaking rule out of hand,
one needs to be concerned about what would happen if someone does use this rule. This
14was the reason universality was required in the …rst place—otherwise a social planner must
play a guessing game about the matching regime when choosing a strategy.
Notice the minor e¤ect of straightforwardness and how little choice was needed. All
that is needed is that the matching game has more than four players, and that one player
chooses using the speci…ed preferences. On the other side r1 only has to know the social
status of the people she may be matched with tomorrow, and this information with any
positive probability.
4.2 The Primary Result.
The only restriction on the repeated matching games in the proof is that the stage game
satis…es the non-equivalent utilities condition.
De…nition 7 A stage game satis…es non-equivalent utilities (NEU) if there is no i and
k 6= i such that ¼i (a)=®¼k (a)+¯, ® ¸ 0.
This condition is easily veri…able and weak, it fails only in games of pure coordination.
Abreu, Dutta and Smith [2] prove a folk theorem for all standard repeated games that
satisfy this, making it the weakest su¢cient condition in the literature.
However, unlike Abreu et al. [2] this folk theorem will only show that any payo¤ that
dominates the minmax in pure strategies can be supported. This is a signi…cant restriction
in standard repeated games, less so in matching games. Below I analyze this restriction
and conjecture about how and when the folk theorem could be extended.
Abreu, Dutta and Smith show this is equivalent to the existence of asymmetric payo¤












and k where k 6= i. Given any arbitrary action pro…le a0 ¼i
¡
a0¢
> 0 for all i and
this vector of action pro…les one can construct a set of vectors
n


























a0 if8k 2 i [ ¹(i)zt
k =0
ak if9k 2 i [ ¹(i)zt
k > 0
(16)

















if 8k 2 i [ ¹(i) zt
k > 1
(17)
The transition rule is again de…ned using a two step function ^ ¿ = f^ ¿n;^ ¿xg:


































0 9k 2 ¹(i)~ zi · ~ zk
~ zi 8k 2 ¹(i)~ zi > ~ zk
for k 2f 1;2;3;:::;Igni
In this strategy anyone who deviates is punished for the next T periods and then always
play ai. The critical di¤erence between this and Kandori’s strategies is that players are
forgiven if they interact with someone who deviated in the same—or later—period.
De…ne A++ = faja 2 A, 8i, ¼i (a) > 0g.
Theorem 1 If the stage game satis…es the NEU conditions, then as ± ! 1; every a0 2 A++
can be supported as the equilibrium path of a social norm.
Proof. We will show there exists a ± such that if ± ¸ ± a0 is an initial equilibrium
path supported by ^ ¾, ^ ¿:We will …rst …nd player’s worst continuation payo¤ given that they
cooperate. When possible, we will then simplify our analysis by showing that one player’s
incentives are always worst than another’s.








, ¢¼i =m a x a2A ¼i (a) ¡
mina2A ¼i (a) and choose T such that ¢¼i <T¼ i
¡
ai¢
for all i. If a player has status zero
her worst possible future is to punish someone for the next T periods playing m¡i,a n dt h e n
play a¡i forever. If a player’s status is one there are two possibly worst futures: either the



























for high enough ±,c h o o s e± such that this condition is true for all i. Then playing ai
forever is the worst possible future and a player with status zero will cooperate when a













Finally, if a player’s status is greater than one and ± ¸ ± then she will cooperate if someone




Just to be clear, this folk theorem satis…es all of the conditions in Kandori [15] except for








i is the continuation value in period t+s for player i. However this is easily
satis…ed by the above strategy. All one has to do is have a player play ai for some T1 < 1
periods and then revert to playing a0 forever, thus this folk theorem weakens all of the
restrictions of that folk theorem. Critically it holds for choice driven matching regimes,
but it also holds for all I player games that satisfy the NEU condition.
At the same time it is almost as weak as Abreu, Dutta and Smith [2]. One di¤erence is
that I always require the NEU condition. In two player games Fudenberg and Maskin [10]
prove the folk theorem without the NEU condition. Abreu et al. show in general that if
you can simultaneously minmax players then the NEU condition is not necessary. In these
cases the strategy used punishes all people simultaneously, and this type of strategy will
not work in repeated matching games.
Consider a subgame where person 1 deviated yesterday and must be punished, person 2
has never deviated but will be matched with person 1 tomorrow and forever in the future.
If the game violates the NEU condition, then u2 (a)=®u1 (a)+¯®¸ 0, to avoid degenerate
utility functions assume ®>0.T h i s m e a n s t h a t 2’s continuation payo¤ can not be more
than 1’s. How do you punish 2 if they deviate today? If you use the same punishment path
as for person 1, then the only di¤erence is the …rst period’s payo¤. If you use a harsher
p u n i s h m e n t ,t h e ny o ua r ei nt h es a m es i t u a t i o nn e x tp e r i o dw i t ht h er o l e so fo n ea n dt w o
reversed.
I have found that one can prove a folk theorem over the payo¤ space in two player
games since the highest payo¤ must be a Nash equilibrium. The interested reader can
request this proof from the author, but the general conjecture is that the folk theorem does
not hold if the NEU condition is not satis…ed.
4.3 Durability to Payo¤ Perturbations.
The folk theorem as presented is missing one important characteristic of a matching game.
Since players’ payo¤s are the same regardless of who they are matched with they could do
just as well by always interacting with the same people. The motivation of matching has
to be that payo¤s depend on who one interacts with. In general, this would be a stochastic
repeated matching game and this paper is not about stochastic games. While stochastic
repeated games have been analyzed (Dutta [6]) what can be done when stochastic payo¤s
and matching are combined is uncertain and left for future research.
However, I will now present an environment where matching is bene…cial and the folk
theorem holds. In this game we will only slightly perturb players’ payo¤s. Enough so that
there is a gain to matching, but not so much that the methods above don’t work.
De…nition 8 In the perturbed repeated matching game fAi;¼i;±g
I
i=1 for every player j
17of population i:








´¯ ¯ ¯ ·
¹ ½
2 for all i 2f 1;2;3;:::Ig, t 2f 0;1;2;:::g and ¹j.O n l y p l a y e r j
knows ½j (¢) though ¹ ½ is common knowledge.
Note that these payo¤s decrease if the frequency of interaction increases. There are





if players only knew the realizations of ½j (¢) from t to t + s, s<1,a n dt h e
½j (¢;¢;t) are iid.
Regardless of the normalization the intuition is the same. Assume ± is high enough such
that there is a strict path equilibrium supporting a0 in the unperturbed game. Since the
equilibrium is strict, if the payo¤ from cooperating is decreased by "
2 and the payo¤ from
cheating is increased by "
2 it will not a¤ect anyone’s incentives. Thus their is a strategy
supporting a0 in the perturbed game for small perturbations.
Corollary 1 Given a0 assume ±> ±then there is a ½¤ such that if ¹ ½ · ½¤ there is an
equilibrium of the perturbed repeated game that supports a0.
Proof. Clearly this perturbation can not increase someone’s payo¤s by deviating by
more than (1 ¡ ±)
¹ ½
2 each period, also it can not reduce someone’s payo¤ from cooperating
by more than (1 ¡ ±) ¹ ½
2. Thus the total discounted e¤ect on both values can not be more
than
¹ ½
2. Then the de…nition of ½¤ is


































and all equilibrium conditions will be satis…ed with at least weak inequality.
4.4 A Discussion of Mixed Strategy Equilibria.
Previously I mentioned that since matching games should include the possibility of not inter-
acting the minmax will be in pure strategies—unlike in standard repeated games. However
this is not the only reason that equilibria with a mixed strategy minmax—or other mixed
strategies—should not be considered, here I wish to discuss a second problem with such
equilibria.
In general, the mixed strategy which minmaxes a given player is not a static Nash
equilibrium. In the standard repeated game this is overcome by changing players’ future
payo¤s to make them just indi¤erent today. To achieve this indi¤erence in standard
repeated games players must at least have common beliefs about each other’s payo¤s for
18every future period. This is a palatable assumption in a standard repeated game where a
group of players will interact forever, but in a repeated matching game two players could
interact only once—is the assumption still palatable?
To achieve this indi¤erence in a repeated matching game means that in a large society




for all j and all
t. This assumption is equivalent to stating that you and all other people in your country
have common beliefs about what each other’s incomes are—furthermore for any future date
everyone has common beliefs today about what the distribution will be then. Assuming
player’s payo¤s are independent of time and who is matched together is but a subtler version





And there is a second dimension to the problem. Since the matching regime might be
a¤ected by a player’s action it might depend on which action in the support of the mixed
strategy is played. Thus a player must be indi¤erent over who they interact with. This
problem is why every constant path social norm in the following stage game has a limiting




























this allows any actions in the next T periods but rules out strategies where the action pro…le
cycles. The limiting average payo¤ is lim±!1 (1 ¡ ±)vi. The proof can be requested from
the author.
Understanding what can be done with social norms that are not constant path will
provide insight on how to prove the folk theorem with a mixed strategy minmax. In the
proof the reason that all lower payo¤s fail is that a player could learn step by step that they
will have to minmax forever. Say that i is minmaxing today. She looks around and notices
that if she plays the wrong action in the mixed strategy then tomorrow she will have to
minmax. In order to get her indi¤erent between this action and her others she will have
to be rewarded if she minmaxes tomorrow. Tomorrow the same thing happens, and soon
enough the reward she must be promised can not be delivered.
19With cyclical equilibria we can stop this chain of reasoning. In essence, players cycle
between the payo¤ one is interested in and a strict Nash equilibrium. After this phase if
a column player has to punish a row player by mixing all previous changes in payo¤ are
wiped out. In essence, since strategies that use a mixed punishment in every period are
impossible you mix these strategies with static Nash equilibria. As ± ! 1, the frequency of
this “silent period” can decrease and any payo¤ on the interior of the payo¤ space may be
achievable. The author conjectures the folk theorem can be proven at least in games with
I Nash equilibria if each population’s payo¤ is minimized on a di¤erent equilibrium.
However, as mentioned before the author does not think mixed strategy equilibria exist
in any reasonable model that is closer to reality. While a model should be an abstraction
if including an important and minimal realistic element changes results drastically then
results are suspect. The equilibria in this paper stand up to this criterion, the author does
not think mixed strategy equilibria do.
4.5 The Folk Theorem without Correlated Actions.
A …nal point is that the folk theorem does hold without correlated actions. Since correlat-
ing devices are not commonly observed some feel assuming one is a strong assumption. The
author would like to point out that Francois Forges [8] did show that players who can play
a mixed strategy can create a correlating device (with communication) but would also like
to show that the folk theorem holds without this assumption5. Fudenberg and Maskin [11]
showed that correlated actions can be used without loss of generality in standard repeated
games, but one can not automatically assume the proof extends. The di¢culty is that with-
out correlated actions the matching regime can give a player a lower payo¤ than the payo¤
of any given correlated action, and one must show that these lower payo¤s are su¢cient for
players to be willing to cooperate. Thus the following corollary is included to assure the
reader that Fudenberg and Maskin’s construction can be extended. For simplicity we will
not present detailed strategies, just show that it is possible to construct such strategies.
Corollary 2 (Puri…cation of Correlated Actions) For any correlated action pro…le a0 2











a0¢¯ ¯ <"and w0 is supported as an equilibrium path.
Proof. Fudenberg and Maskin [11] prove that you can construct a sequence that satis…es











5In this case the matching regime would have to be una¤ected by player’s messages.




































which is satis…ed for small enough ´ for all players since ¼i
¡
wi¢





Since Â and ´ are the same for all i,a n d´ only satis…es an inequality constraint, without





can be used for all roles, where the di¤erence between ai (t) and
ak (t) is that when ai (t)=wi when ak (t)=wk and ai (t)=bi, ak (t)=bk.D e … n e













where a¡i (t)=w¡i if ai (t)=wi and a¡i (t)=b¡i if ai (t)=bi:




if a player deviates while being minmaxed
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Thus society can help individuals overcome their short run incentives and act in a cooper-
ative manner. The folk theorem has very simple existence conditions to compensate for
the naturally heterogenous nature of the interaction. It only depends on the payo¤s of
the stage game and the frequency of interaction. This simplicity comes at a cost, trigger
strategies do not support cooperative behavior and the simple optimal penal code does not
always exist.
However the bene…t of the simplicity is signi…cant. A concern of many theorists is the
computational complexity of equilibria we describe. Most people (including this theorist)
are boundedly rational. OFP [18] point out that following a social norm is much easier than
calculating an equilibrium. The essence of a social norm is that you do what you are told.
No computation power is required to determine your optimal choice, you follow instructions.
The equilibria here take this insight one step further. As long as everyone in the repeated
21matching game is committed and people’s payo¤s are not too heterogenous, people never
need to know anything except the social status of the person they are interacting with.
They can blithely live their lives knowing that whatever happens they should just do as
they are told. Thus these equilibria require a minimal amount of computation.
At the same time the generality of the conclusions can seem troubling. After all
this analysis shows that if players are patient enough then anything can happen. They
don’t even have to interact with the same people—one testable restriction in most previous
analysis. The author thinks this impression is false. This paper does not prove that
societies can cooperate arbitrarily, it shows that they can if they have a well developed
mechanism. It should be clear that if the analyst can not point to the mechanism then this
paper says nothing. Identifying and understanding the mechanism is an appropriate goal
for empirical analysis of social norms. What is indicated is that the mechanism does not
have to be run by some government agency, in fact it can be very informal. Examples that
illustrate this point abound. Udry [23] found that rural Nigerians did not su¤er from credit
shortages because they used an informal information network to overcome the moral hazard
problem. Greif [12] showed that the Maghibiri traders used a more formalized network—
with a centralized information depository—to enable shipping across the Mediterranean
during the Middle Ages. Milgrom, North and Weingast [17] found an explicit mechanism
in the Champagne fairs. The fairs operated as quality guarantor by banning anyone accused
of not trading fairly. Thus they helped trade ‡ourish at the beginning of the Renaissance.
In the political science literature Ostrom [19] and others have been extensively studying
modern social norms used to overcome public good problems. This literature can also
contribute to the theoretic literature by examining how these social norms develop. Ostrom
[19] and Greif [13] have done analysis of this type.
The theory of social norms currently has several signi…cant issues that should be ad-
dressed. One is allowing for more heterogeneity. Obviously heterogeneity is important for
matching games and the amount allowed for here is much less than the amount observed.
Dutta [6] has established a folk theorem with weak conditions for stochastic repeated games.
While it would perhaps be simple to combine a stochastic game and a matching game, it
might be harder to satisfy a condition similar to universality. However the motivation for
this is as strong as for universality, one can not expect the analyst and the players of the
game to know all the details of other players’ payo¤s. Another problem is that the analysis
does not allow for free exit. Free entry can easily be dealt with by the universal restriction,
but exit can not be allowed. Empirically this is an important subject, Ostrom [19] …nds
that limiting free exit is one indicator of a successful social norm. Understanding this point
theoretically would be bene…cial. A related question is what happens if there are competing
22social norms?
This paper has developed the understanding of cooperative behavior in market inter-
actions. Many market interactions have their element of moral hazard or agency, and a
general theory of how these problems are overcome has long been needed. The traditional
solution is to rely on courts, but what if these institutions do not function properly or do
not exist? Is the economy dependent on them? The theoretical and empirical literature
suggest not; an understanding of this point should be developed.
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